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Abstract.  Studies on welfare programs in the United States have identified three types of welfare 
migration (employment, benefit, and amenity-related).  This paper introduces a fourth type 
of migration induced by welfare time limits.  After a welfare-dependent family runs out of 
benefits, it is possible for them to reset the Temporary Assistance for Needy Families time 
clock by crossing state lines to extend their benefits. Our theoretical results suggest that the 
likelihood of migration increases if the migration distance is small or the gain from the move 
is large.  We hypothesize that, ceteris paribus, families migrating in order to extend their bene-
fits will minimize the distance they migrate, and will be likely to move into the nearest state, 
especially into counties just across the state border. We utilize macro data at the county level 
to look for evidence of time-limit induced migration. Estimates indicate that time limits may 
be associated with an increase in welfare migration.  
 
 
 
1. Introduction 
 
 In 1996 the U.S. Congress passed the Personal Re-
sponsibility and Work Opportunity Reconciliation Act 
of 1996 (PRWORA).  PRWORA altered the rules gov-
erning federal funding of welfare and disbursement of 
aid to qualifying households by replacing Aid to Fami-
lies with Dependent Children (AFDC) with Tempo-
rary Assistance for Needy Families (TANF).  Specifi-
cally, TANF allowed the States to tailor their welfare 
programs as they saw fit, and altered how the Federal 
government provided funding to the states.  However, 
states were encouraged to impose lifetime limits1, in-
crease work requirements and strengthen sanctions.  A 
majority of TANF studies done recently present evi-
dence suggesting that the welfare reforms adopted by 
PRWORA have numerous unintended consequences 
that negatively impact the well-being of the nation’s 
poor (Brueckner, 2000; Kaestner, Kaushal and Van 
Ryzin, 2003; Grogger and Michalopoulos, 2003; Grog-
ger, 2003, 2004a and 2004b, and De Jong, Graefe, and 
                                                 
1 If states allow welfare recipients to stay on welfare for more than 5 
years, the state bears the full cost of these benefits.  Michigan and 
Vermont have not imposed any time limits (See Table 5). 
St. Pierre, 2005).  
 Brueckner (2000) summarizes the theoretical and 
empirical evidence supporting the existence of a “race 
to the bottom” in benefits that has resulted due to the 
shift from matching grants under the old AFDC rules 
to the block grants used in the TANF program.  Ac-
cording to Brueckner, the race to the bottom in bene-
fits arises from the belief among state policy makers 
that benefit-related immigration will occur if their 
state is more generous than a neighboring state.  
Though the empirical evidence verifying the existence 
of benefit-related migration is inconclusive, the policy 
makers’ fear of becoming a “welfare magnet” results 
in the equalizing of benefits at socially undesirable 
levels (Southwick, 1981; Gramlich and Laren, 1984; 
Blank, 1988; Walker, 1994; Levine and Zimmerman, 
1995; Enchautegui, 1997; Borjas, 1998; and Meyer, 
1998). 
 Kaestner et al. (2003) propose that a race to the 
bottom in benefits is not the only unintended conse-
quence of the TANF provisions.  They argue that 
TANF time limits reduce the present value of benefit 
differentials between states, which in turn lowers 
benefit-related migration.  They also claim that work 
requirements and stiffer sanctions increase the likeli-
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hood of employment-related migration among low-
income single mothers.  The estimates of De Jong et al. 
(2005) imply that welfare reform has stimulated inter-
state immigration.  These results seem plausible since 
TANF participation requires welfare recipients to 
work or participate in a training program in many 
states.  If an area’s neighbors have more robust 
economies, welfare recipients living in the depressed 
economy may migrate for employment reasons.  The 
estimates of Kaestner et al. (2003) suggest that TANF 
welfare policies have reduced all forms of migration 
other than employment-related migration.  
 The welfare reform literature, comprehensively 
reviewed in Grogger, Karoly and Klerman (2002), and 
the emerging time-limited welfare literature (e.g., 
Kaushal and Kaestner, 2001; Grogger and Michalopou-
los, 2003; and Grogger, 2003, 2004a and 2004b) exam-
ine the impacts of reforms such as work requirements, 
time limits and sanctions on caseloads and participa-
tion. These studies have all come to a similar conclu-
sion: reforms such as time limits generally reduce par-
ticipation and state caseloads.  Much of the welfare 
reform literature attempts to determine which factors 
are associated with the large fall in the caseload.  For 
example, Fang and Keane (2004) attribute 57, 26, 11, 
and 7 percent of the caseload reduction between 1993 
and 2000 to work requirements, the Earned Income 
Tax Credit, time limits, and the economy of the late 
1990s, respectively.  
 The literature on time limits delves a little deeper 
by looking at child outcomes.  According to Grogger 
and Michalopoulos (2003) and Grogger (2003, 2004a, 
2004b), time limits unintentionally reduce welfare par-
ticipation the most among families that need assis-
tance the most—those with young children. On the 
other hand, Kaushal and Kaestner (2001) find that the 
imposition of time limits has had a positive impact on 
low-educated, unmarried women with children.  They 
found that women who left welfare for employment 
work nearly 30 hours per week on average, represent-
ing a large improvement in their financial status even 
at low-skilled wages.   
 Most of the welfare migration literature has fo-
cused on interstate benefit-related migration, which 
investigates the propensity for families to move to a 
state with higher benefit levels. Kaestner et al. (2003) 
study employment-related and amenity-related migra-
tion, where families may have an incentive to move in 
order to take advantage of better job markets or other 
desirable characteristics of a region.  We introduce a 
fourth type of migration induced explicitly by welfare 
time limits—for the remainder of this paper we refer 
to this type of migration as time-limit migration.    
 As previously mentioned, Kaestner et al. (2003) 
reason that because TANF lowers the present value of 
lifetime benefits, migration is likely to decrease.  This 
prediction neglects the fact that when benefits run out 
in one state, it is possible to move to a different state to 
re-enroll.  This also assumes that welfare recipients 
have long planning horizons and low discount rates, 
which is assumed by studies such as Grogger and 
Michalopoulos (2003) and Swann (2005).  In contrast, 
Snarr and Axelsen (2006) argue that they are likely to 
have high discount rates as evidenced by their bor-
rowing behavior.  As discussed in Stegman and Faris 
(2003), families with a history of being on welfare are 
highly likely to borrow at high interest rates from 
payday lenders, even though these institutions appear 
to avoid neighborhoods with high rates of welfare par-
ticipation2 (Burkey and Simkins, 2004).  Therefore, 
changes in income streams far in the future are 
unlikely to impact the current decision making in this 
population.  If welfare households desire to stay on 
welfare, they may decide to migrate to extend their 
benefits.  And, according to Meyer (1998), the likeli-
hood of this form of migration increases the closer the 
household lives to the nearest state border because the 
cost of such a move is relatively small with respect to 
its short-term gain in household income.3
 
 
 Consider the decision of a welfare-dependent fam-
ily in Los Angeles, California whose benefits have run 
out. Such a family would have to move quite a dis-
tance to reach a neighboring state and sign up for new 
benefits, and will likely seek employment.  Contrast 
this with the decision of residents in adjacent counties 
A and B, separated only by a state borderline.  When 
welfare recipients in these two counties begin to run 
out of benefits, families from county A may move to 
county B and sign up for benefits again, and vice 
versa. In these counties welfare enrollment rates will 
not drop, as the counties will merely be exchanging 
beneficiaries.  We refer to the possibility that recipients 
living along state-lines might “jump” across the bor-
der in order to extend their welfare benefits as the 
“welfare-flipping hypothesis”.  
 Several factors make welfare flipping possible: 
First, according to the U.S. Department of Health and 
Human Services (2000a), even though PRWORA re-
quires the States to enforce federally-mandated time 
limits and exchange information, states do not cur-
                                                 
2 Instead, they prefer the working poor as customers. 
3 Migration between Portland, OR and Vancouver, WA, is an exam-
ple of how inexpensive time-limit migration can be.  Portland and 
Vancouver are separated only by the Columbia River, which hap-
pens to be the southern border between these states.  Two interstate 
bridges, I-205 and I-5, connect the two communities.  To counter 
this, states like Washington, Idaho and Oregon are in the process of 
forming data-sharing agreements to detect abuses.  
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rently share data.  Second, according to Lindert (2005), 
the failure to set up a national database has hindered 
the enforcement of time limits and has allowed some 
individuals to “double dip” by simultaneously collect-
ing benefits in two states at once.  Lastly, although 
several states have tried to limit benefits in various 
ways for immigrants, the U.S. Supreme Court has 
struck down these attempts citing the Privileges and 
Immunities Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.4
 
 This paper essentially merges the welfare reform 
and welfare migration literatures. We do this by rec-
ognizing that if households understand that assistance 
ends in x months, households must eventually work 
when their benefits expire.  For many reasons, house-
holds participating in welfare may want to extend 
their benefits by welfare-flipping. Perhaps these 
households are unable, unwilling, or ill-prepared to 
leave the welfare rolls so they choose to migrate to a 
nearby state if the cost associated with the move is 
relatively small.  After TANF benefits run out, a 
household will receive no assistance if it remains in its 
home state.  However, if this household considers mi-
grating to the nearest state, the benefit differential is 
actually quite large—much larger than benefit differ-
entials considered previously in the literature.  Since 
the states do not share data and minimum residency 
requirements are not imposed, the benefit differential 
is equal to a neighboring state’s benefit payment.  Be-
cause there are costs associated with migration, time-
limit migration will be more likely along state borders.  
If a race to the bottom in benefits has occurred, then 
state benefit levels have already reached an “insuffi-
ciently generous” equilibrium (Brueckner, 2000).  This 
raises the question: If benefit levels have reached equi-
librium and low-income households are still migrat-
ing, what incentive are they responding to?  The mi-
gration literature, surveyed extensively by Meyer 
(1998) and Brueckner (2000), and the time-limited wel-
fare literature (Kaushal and Kaestner, 2001; Grogger 
and Michalopoulos, 2003; and Grogger, 2003, 2004a 
and 2004b) have not yet studied the possibility that 
migration can be induced by time limits.    
 
2. Welfare Migration Theory  
 
 To demonstrate the effect of time limits on the mi-
                                                 
4 Prior to 1969 states could impose minimum residency require-
ments on U.S. citizens that had just recently emigrated from other 
states (U.S. Department of Health, Education, and Welfare, 1969).  
By the end of 1969, according to Rosenheim (1970), the U.S. Supreme 
Court ruled that minimum residency requirements were unconstitu-
tional.  More recently, the U.S. Supreme Court ruled that Califor-
nia’s practice of paying immigrants the benefit they would have 
received from the state they moved from was unconstitutional 
(Saenz v. Roe, 526 U.S. 489, 1999).  
gration of welfare families we analyze a simple two-
period utility model.  Our model differs from those 
found in the migration literature (Brown and Oates, 
1987; Wildasin, 1991; Brueckner, 2000; and Kaestner et 
al., 2003) because we model the effect time limits have 
on the decision to migrate in the final month of TANF 
eligibility.  With this in mind, period one represents 
the final month of eligibility for a household living in 
its home state.  In period two the household can par-
ticipate in welfare if it migrates to the nearest state. 
However, if it does not migrate it cannot use welfare 
because it runs out of eligibility. We assume that 
households considering migration maximize the fol-
lowing two-period utility function: 
  
1 2 1 2( , ) ln( ) ln( )u c c c cβ= +  (1) 
 
where ct denotes the household’s consumption in pe-
riod t, and β is the household’s discount factor, which 
is assumed to be positive and less than one.  We let m 
denote the migration decision: m = 1 if the household 
migrates, 0 otherwise.  
 Following Brueckner (2000), we assume state out-
put depends on the size of the low-skilled labor force 
(N) given fixed levels of capital and land, and so that 
the wage rate is determined by  
 
 ( )w f N′=  (2) 
 
where ( )f N′  is the marginal product of the Nth 
worker. Assuming diminishing marginal productivity, 
immigration lowers the low-skilled wage rate.  If the 
household participates in welfare, its income includes 
the cash grant G from the government (benefit level) 
and wh labor market earnings, where h is the number 
of hours the household works on welfare (h ≥ 0).  
Households that do not participate in welfare earn wH 
dollars per period, where H represents full participa-
tion in the labor market (h ≤ H).  If the household mi-
grates, it incurs a cost of ( d Fκ + ) dollars where κ is 
the per unit migration cost of moving distance d units 
and F is the fixed cost of the move.    
 As a basis for comparison, we first consider the 
migration decision of a household under a lifetime 
entitlement policy.  Such households maximize equa-
tion (1) subject to  
 
 
1 2( ) ( )(1 )
n nG wh G w h d F m G wh m c cκ β β + + + − − + + − = +       (3a) 
 
where the superscript n identifies the neighboring 
state’s cash grant and wage rate. The solution to this 
problem uses a two-step procedure: First, the house-
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hold determines its optimal level of consumption in 
both periods, conditional on the migration decision.  
Optimal consumption in both periods is given by cE in 
this Entitlement regime:  
 
( ) ( )( )
1
n n
E G wh G G w h wh d F m G whc m κ β ββ
+ + − + − − − + += +
     (4.a) 
 
 Given this function, the household decides to mi-
grate or not.  If migration makes the household better 
off, it migrates.  Substituting equation (4) into equation 
(1) yields the household’s indirect utility function un-
der the lifetime entitlement policy: 
  
 ( ) ( )ln ( ) ln ( )E E Emv c m c mβ= +    
 
 The household migrates if its indirect lifetime util-
ity from migrating ( 1
Ev ) exceeds its indirect lifetime 
utility of staying ( 0
Ev ). The following proposition de-
scribes the household’s optimal migration decision 
under a lifetime entitlement policy:5 
 PROPOSITION 1. Migration occurs if d is less than 
the critical distance 
 
 ( ) ( )
n n
E G G w h wh Fd κ
− + − −=  (5.a) 
 
 The larger the critical distance, the more migration 
will occur because more welfare-eligible households 
will live within dE of the nearest county across the 
state border.  Note that this condition is composed of 
two “differentials” between the home and a neighbor-
ing state, one comparing benefit levels and one com-
paring wage levels.  Proposition 1 is consistent with 
the results found in Brueckner (2000) and Kaestner et 
al. (2003).  Given the home state’s cash grant (G) and 
earnings (wh), neighboring states with higher benefits 
(G n) or wage rates (wn) have larger differentials.  Lar-
ger differentials raise the critical distance, and thus 
increase the probability of migration.  Because states 
with high benefit levels (magnet states) attract immi-
grants, their labor force (N) grows, causing the wage 
rate in magnet states to fall.  This implies that wages in 
magnet states are driven down by benefit-related mi-
gration.  Thus, benefit-related migration will some-
what offset the incentive for employment-related mi-
gration, which may explain why the results in the mi-
gration literature is mixed. 
 Under time limits, the household’s two-period 
budget constraint is given by 
                                                 
5 All proofs are in the Appendix. 
1 2( ) (1 )
n nG wh G w h d F m wH m c cκ β β + + + − − + − = +      (3.b) 
 
Optimal consumption in both periods is given by cT in 
this Time limit regime: 
 
( )( )
1
n n
T G wh G w h wH d F m wHc m κ β ββ
+ + + − − − += +
 (4.b) 
 
The following proposition describes the household’s 
optimal migration decision under the time limit pol-
icy:  
 PROPOSITION 2. Time-limit migration occurs if 
the distance to the nearest state is less than the critical 
distance d T  
 
 ( 0) ( )n nT G w h wH Fd κ
− + − −= . (5.b) 
 
 Comparing Propositions 1 and 2 yields some in-
teresting conclusions concerning time limits.  First, the 
benefit differential is larger under time limits.  As dis-
cussed earlier, the benefit differential under time lim-
its is the amount of the cash grant offered in the near-
est state (G n), which is much larger than it would be 
had the state not imposed a time limit (G n – G).  Con-
versely, the earnings differential (wnh − wH) is smaller 
in states that have imposed time limits than it is for 
states that have not (wnh − wh) since H was assumed to 
be larger than h. The earnings differential is also af-
fected by the size of the low-skilled labor force. Thus, 
households that are in their last month of eligibility 
are faced with a larger benefit differential but a 
smaller earnings differential than would have existed 
if their home state had not imposed time limits.  This 
suggests that time limits have two opposing effects on 
migration, which raises the question: Which effect is 
larger?  
 Time limits induce welfare migration if the critical 
distance increases after time limits are imposed, ceteris 
paribus:6 
 
 0T E G wh wHd d κ
+ −− = >  (6) 
 
 This inequality holds only if income available on 
welfare in the household’s home state ( )G wh+  is 
larger than it would have been off welfare (wH). Thus, 
emigration from time-limit states is influenced by the 
benefit levels they choose. If these states are located 
                                                 
6 If one includes the disutility of work in the model, then the earn-
ings differential become a less powerful influence on the migration 
decision. 
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near entitlement states, the latter are likely to become 
even stronger welfare magnets under TANF than un-
der the old AFDC rules.  This is true for two reasons: 
First, entitlement states experience very little emigra-
tion because they did not impose time limits.  Second, 
entitlement states may receive considerable immigra-
tion from nearby time-limit states.  Furthermore, in 
regions where states are smaller such as in the North-
east, more welfare flipping is likely to occur as most 
state residents will live near the border of at least one 
other state.  
 
3. Data 
 
 The data for the analysis come from the 1990 and 
2000 U.S. Censuses and the Regional Economic Infor-
mation System (REIS).  The variable definitions and 
sources for the study are listed in Table 1.  The U.S. 
Census datasets allow us to compare welfare enroll-
ment rates between border and nonborder counties 
that are likely to be affected by time limits (Meyer, 
1998 and McKinnish, 2005).  These censuses are oppor-
tune because many households that were on welfare 
when PRWORA was enacted in 1996 would be reach-
ing their respective time limits by the year 2000.  The 
1990 and 2000 census data gives us a clear before and 
after picture of welfare utilization rates of our target 
and control groups.    
 The actual welfare caseload and its percent of 
population changed between 1992 and 1999 is shown 
in Table 2. According to Table 2, the caseload and the 
percent of households on welfare peaked in 1994. The 
decline in the welfare caseload from its peak is the 
largest in U.S. history, and the percentage of the popu-
lation on welfare in 1999 of 2.6 percentage points was 
the lowest it had been since 1965 (U.S. Department of 
Health and Human Services, 2000b).  From 1992 to 
1999 the participation rate fell 52 percent.  In our data 
analysis we define the welfare enrollment rate as the 
percentage of households that reported receiving pub-
lic assistance.  In the first row of Table 3 one sees a 
similar decrease in welfare enrollment using this defi-
nition.  Computed from the 1990 and 2000 U.S. Cen-
suses, our variable suggests that county participation 
rates fell by nearly 60 percent over a slightly longer 
period of time.  
 
 
Table 1. Variable Definitions and Data Sources 
 
Variable Definition 
 
1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses   
 
PHRPA  Percent of households (occupied housing units) receiving public assistance  
BORD  Border County dummy equal to 1 if the county is shares a border with   
 another state, zero otherwise  
MTLH  The number of months that elapsed between the dates that families living in a county that 
could have potentially reached a time limit and the 2000 Census interview  
MTLN  The number of months that elapsed between the dates that families living in the nearest state 
that could have potentially reached a time limit and the 2000 Census interview 
DIST Distance from a county centroid to the nearest state border, in miles  
UNEM  County unemployment rate 
RENT  Median county rent (in 1990 dollars) 
EDUC  Percent of county population 25 and older with some college or more  
ARMED  Percent of county population 16 and older in the Armed services  
URBAN  Percent of all county housing units in an Urbanized area 
HISPAN  Percent of county residents that are Hispanic 
BLACK  Percent of county residents that are Black 
NATIVE  Percent of county residents that are native American  
 
Regional Economic Information System 
 
EMPGR Percentage growth in service sector jobs in 1988-1989 or 1998-1999. 
SERWG Real average yearly wages in the service industry, 1988 and 1998 (in 1988 dollars) 
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Table 2.  AFDC/TANF Caseload (1992-1999)  
 
  Estimated U.S. AFDC/TANF  Percent of U.S. 
 Fiscal Population Recipients Population 
 Year (1000s) (1000s) (%) 
 
 1992 254,462 13,625 5.4 
 1993 257,379 14,143 5.5 
 1994 259,935 14,226 5.5 
 1995 262,392 13,660 5.2 
 1996 264,827 12,645 4.8 
 1997 267,346 10,823 4.0 
 1998 269,845 8,779 3.3 
 1999 272,286 7,188 2.6 
 
Source: U. S. Department of Health and Human Services (2000b)  
 
 
Table 3.  Descriptive Statistics of Key Variables 
 
 
 1990 2000 
 ______________________________ ______________________________ 
 Mean S.D. Min. Max. Mean S.D. Min. Max. 
 
 (1) PHRPA  8.46 4.52 0 44.11 3.39 1.90 0 18.54 
 (2) UNEM  6.65 3.07 0 30.53 5.74 2.64 0 33.03 
 (3) EMPGR 2.17 5.55 -31.98 73.00 2.43 6.62 -28.14  96.89 
 (4) SERWG  13.53 3.96 2.10 41.28 14.12 4.30 3.92 51.97 
 (5) RENT 321.11 96.10 140.00 926.00 440.70 122.10 206.00 1185.00 
 (6) EDUC  35.24 11.00 11.70 81.16 42.63 11.21 16.90 85.39 
 (7) ARMED  0.53 2.54 0 64.46 0.35 1.93 0 60.33  
 (8) URBAN  13.83 29.60 0 100.00 16.62 32.00 0 100.00 
 (9) HISPAN  4.40 11.07 0 97.54 6.16 12.12 0 98.10 
 (10) BLACK  8.58 14.35 0 86.04 8.72 14.50 0 86.08 
 (11) NATIVE  1.21 5.10 0 89.02 1.74 6.86 0 92.75 
 
Source: 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses 
 
 
 The remaining rows in Table 3 present the descrip-
tive statistics for several other key variables in the data 
set, which are presented separately for years 1990 and 
2000.  The average rate of job growth in the service 
sector grew slightly faster at the end of the 1990’s than 
it did at the end of the 1980’s.  The average county un-
employment rate fell from 6.65 to 5.74, a 14 percent 
decrease, while the real yearly wages in the service 
sector were slightly higher in 1999 than in 1989.  Rows 
5-9 of Table 3 summarize basic county-level demo-
graphic information about the households surveyed in 
the two censuses.  The percent of persons 25 years of 
age or older with some college or higher level of edu-
cation rose 21 percent.  The mean percentage of county 
population that are Hispanic rose from 4.4 to 6.2 per-
centage points—while the percent of county popula-
tion that is black remained, for the most part, constant. 
The percent of county population in the armed ser-
vices fell 34 percent. The percent of households living 
in urban areas increased from 13.8 percent in 1990 to 
16.6 percent by 2000.  
 Table 4 presents the descriptive statistics for sev-
eral key variables, which are presented separately for 
border (b) and nonborder (nb) counties for the years 
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1990 and 2000. According to this table, the welfare en-
rollment rate in border counties fell from 8.52 to 3.48 
percent of households. In nonborder counties this rate 
fell from 8.43 to 3.34, a slightly larger decline.  Simplis-
tically, if we allow ,c tP  to be the average proportion of 
families on welfare in counties of type c (where c is 
either denoted nb or b) in time t, we have the differ-
ence-in-differences estimator:   
 
 ,99 ,89 ,99 ,89( ) ( )nb nb b bP P P P P∆∆ = − − −  (7)  
 
 This method allows us to compare the decrease in 
welfare participation in non-border counties over the 
decade to that of border counties, and operates under 
the following two assumptions.  First, that the mar-
ginal propensity to migrate is most likely constant 
within groups in the absence of time limits.  Second, 
the groups value other non-welfare state characteris-
tics equally.  Therefore, our method allows us to net 
out the within-state relationship between welfare 
benefits and participation.  In other words, border 
counties should exhibit smaller declines in welfare 
participation rates, but the difference between border 
and nonborder counties should reflect the differential 
due to “welfare-flipping” in the border counties.  
Looking at the raw averages for the above, the differ-
ence-in-differences estimate is  
 
 (3.34 8.43) (3.48 8.52) 0.05P∆∆ = − − − = −   
 
 
 
Table 4A.  1990 Census Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Border Counties (N=1137) Nonborder Counties (N=1972) 
 Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
 PHRPA  8.52 4.63 8.43 4.46   
 UNEM  6.77 3.28 6.58 2.93   
 EMPGR 2.15 5.53 2.18 5.55 
 SERWG 13.70 3.95 13.43 3.96 
 RENT  316.02 95.11 324.02 96.56   
 EDUC  34.98 10.60 35.40 11.22   
 ARMED  0.53 2.78 0.53 2.39   
 URBAN  13.76 29.17 13.87 29.85   
 HISPAN  3.48 8.84 4.93 12.14   
 BLACK  8.15 14.49 8.82 14.26   
 NATIVE  1.39 5.53 1.10 4.83 
 
Table 4B.  2000 Census Descriptive Statistics 
 
 Border Counties (N=1137) Nonborder Counties (N=1972) 
 Variable  Mean  Std Dev  Mean  Std Dev 
 PHRPA  3.48 2.00 3.34 1.84   
 UNEM  5.86 2.75 5.68 2.57 
 EMPGR 2.33 6.07 2.48 6.92 
 SERWG 14.18 4.34 14.08 4.27 
 RENT  431.95 115.55 445.71 125.54   
 EDUC  42.42 10.80 42.75 11.44   
 ARMED  0.35 2.21 0.36 1.74   
 URBAN  16.64 31.61 16.61 32.23   
 HISPAN  5.03 9.91 6.81 13.18   
 BLACK  8.30 14.65 8.95 14.42   
 NATIVE  2.28 8.95 1.44 5.33 
Source: 1990 and 2000 U.S. Censuses 
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 While this estimate is small, it must be understood 
with the caveat that much of the TANF caseload 
would not have reached its time limit by the end of 
1999.  We may observe larger differentials after ac-
counting for time limits in home states and nearby 
states and controlling for the economy, state-specific 
effects and other potential confounding factors.  
 Our principal independent variables are the home 
state and nearby state time limit policies.  As seen in 
Table 5, the time limit policy varies significantly from 
state to state.  As of 2000, 38 states had imposed a 60-
month lifetime time limit while seven states imposed 
lifetime limits less than or equal to 48 months.  Fifteen 
states have set intermediate time limits which deny or 
reduce benefits for a period of time for households 
that have accumulated a certain number of months of 
TANF assistance.  Neither Vermont nor Michigan has 
imposed time limits of any form.  The last column in 
Table 5 lists dates that indicate the year and month 
that families began reaching a time limit.  Accordingly, 
we define the variable Tit to be the number of months 
that elapsed between the dates that families living in 
county i began reaching time limits and the 2000 Cen-
sus.  Similarly, we define the variable Tnit to be the 
number of months that elapsed between the dates that 
families living in the state nearest to county i could 
have potentially reached a time limit and the 2000 
Census interview. These variables capture the effect of 
the “intensity” of the time limit policy adopted in 
counties and states nearest to them.7  
 
4. Research Design and Statistical Methods  
 
 The theoretical model presented in Section 2 leads 
to a random utility model8 because the observed 
choice (migrating or not) reveals which choice pro-
vides greater constrained utility, but not the unob-
served constrained utilities derived from each deci-
sion.  When micro data is used, probit and logit re-
gression models are used to estimate the coefficients of 
random utility models.  Since public use micro data 
does not indicate detailed information regarding resi-
dence before and after a move, we use aggregate, 
county-based data from the US Census which prohib-
its the use of dummy dependent variable techniques.  
Utilizing Census data at the county level will allow us 
to determine if distance affects the change in welfare 
                                                 
7 For the construction of these two variables we assumed 2000 U.S. 
Census interviews were conducted at the beginning of April, 2000.  
The Census Bureau declared April 1st, 2000 as a key target date for 
the census. 
8 For more information on random utility models, see pp. 818-820 of 
Greene (2000). 
participation rates after time limits were imposed.  To 
obtain estimates of the time limit effect on migration 
we rely on a difference-in-difference (DD) type meth-
odology similar to methodologies common in the wel-
fare migration literature (Southwick, 1981; Walker, 
1994; Levine and Zimmerman, 1995; Borjas, 1998; 
Meyer, 1998; Brueckner, 2000, McKinnish, 2005).   
 Following Kaestner et al. (2003), we include state-
level controls for time limits (Tit, Tnit). Kaestner et al. 
(2003) included a variety of other independent vari-
ables in their logistic regressions even though they did 
not report their corresponding estimated coefficients.  
They included age, race, level of education attained, 
state of residence, urban-rural status, year, and unem-
ployment rate.  Because we use macro data, we in-
clude their counterparts aggregated at the county level 
(see Table 1). Important control variables that may 
affect the change in welfare participation rates are race 
(particularly the Hispanic immigration boom in some 
counties) and state fixed effects attributable to differ-
ences in the welfare policies adopted by the states not 
captured by the time limit variables discussed above.   
We use a border county dummy variable to separate 
our sample of counties into the target and control 
groups (Di = 1 if the county is on a state border, 0 oth-
erwise). A map of the border counties as defined in 
this paper is shown in Figure 1.  According to our 
model, border counties are more likely to receive im-
migrants from other states if migrants want to mini-
mize travel costs.  If the estimated coefficient of this 
control is positive and significant, then participation in 
border counties is higher than in non-border counties.  
In addition to this, if the coefficient of the interaction 
between the nearest state’s time limit policy (Tnit) and 
border county dummy (Di) is positive and significant, 
then border counties contiguous with time limit states 
are experiencing higher than expected welfare partici-
pation, ceteris paribus. This would be an indication that 
these counties are receiving immigrant families who 
are welfare flipping.  
 The regression model we estimate is  
 
 
1 1 2 3+ +
n n
ijt it it i it it j t itP D T T DTα α α δ υ η ε′= + + + + +βX  (8) 
 
where Pijt is welfare participation in county i of state j 
at time t and Xit is the vector of county aggregates 
measured at time t  mentioned above.  State effects are 
vj, which are taken to be constant over time t and spe-
cific to the individual state j.  Year effects are nt, which 
is taken to be constant over counties and states.  The 
parameter δ is equivalent to the DD estimator in equa-
tion (7) after controlling for demographics, policy, and 
state differences.  
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Table 5.  State TANF Time Limit Policy 
 
 
  Shorter Time Limit  Lifetime Limit Date Families First 
 STATE  (months)   (months)   Exceed a Limit* 
 
 
 Alabama   60 11/2001    
 Arizona  24 in 60  None   11/1997    
 Arkansas   24 7/2000    
 California  60 1/2003    
 Colorado  60 7/2002    
 Connecticut  21 60 11/1997   
 Delaware   36 10/1999   
 Dist. of Col.  60 3/2002    
 Florida  24 in 60 or 36 in 72  48 10/1998   
 Georgia   48 1/2001   
 Idaho  24 7/1999   
 Illinois   60 7/2002   
 Indiana   24 8/1997   
 Iowa   60 1/2002   
 Kansas   60 10/2001  
 Kentucky   60 11/2001  
 Louisiana  24 in 60  60 12/1998  
 Maine  60 11/2001  
 Maryland  60 1/2002  
 Massachusetts  24 in 60   None  12/1998 
 Michigan  None   None    
 Minnesota   60 7/2002  
 Mississippi   60 10/2001  
 Missouri   60 7/2002  
 Montana   60 2/2002  
 Nebraska  24 in 48  None 12/1998  
 Nevada 24 ineligible for 12 60 1/2000    
 New Hampshire   60 10/2001 
 New Jersey   60 4/2002    
 New Mexico  60 7/2002    
 New York   60 12/2001  
 North Carolina 24 ineligible for 36 60 8/1998    
 North Dakota  60 7/2002    
 Ohio  36 ineligible for 24 60 10/2000  
 Oklahoma  60 10/2001  
 Oregon 24 in 84 None 7/1998    
 Pennsylvania  60 3/2002    
 Rhode Island  60 5/2002    
 South Carolina 24 in 120  60 10/1998 
 South Dakota  60 12/2001  
 Tennessee  18 ineligible for 3    60 4/1998    
 Texas 12, 24, or 36 60 1/1998    
 Utah  36 1/2000    
 Vermont   None None   
 Virginia   24 ineligible for 24 60 10/1999  
 Washington  60 8/2002    
 West Virginia  60 12/2001 
 Wisconsin 24 60 4/1999    
 Wyoming  60 2/1999  
Source: Table A.2, Bloom, Farrell and Fink (2002).  
*Denotes the month following the date families could potentially accumulate the maximum 
number of months of TANF assistance. 
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5. Results  
 
 The empirical estimates of equation (8) are sum-
marized in Tables 6 and 7.  Column (i) in Table 6 dis-
plays the results of estimating equation (8) without the 
county-level controls (Xit) while column (ii) gives the 
results with these controls.  Both of these regressions 
were estimated with year-effects and state fixed ef-
fects.  In addition, the White estimator was used to 
correct the standard errors for heteroskedasticity 
(White, 1980). Comparing the results in the two col-
umns of Table 6 shows a dramatic improvement in fit 
when county-level controls are included in the regres-
sion.  In column (ii) we see that when the control vari-
ables are included, the impact of being a border 
county becomes much smaller and statistically insig-
nificant.  In addition, the interaction between the bor-
der county dummy and nearest state’s time limit is 
insignificant in either specification.  This outcome 
most likely results from using border counties as a 
coarse approximation of migration costs.  As seen in 
Figure 1, migration distances can be very large in the 
western U.S., even for a typical resident in a border 
county.  In an attempt to more accurately measure mi-
gration costs, we calculated the distance of each 
county’s centroid to the nearest state border (DIST) 
instead of the border county dummy in subsequent 
regressions. 
 
 
Figure 1.  Counties along State Borders 
 
 Additionally, the linear functional form exhibited 
a high degree of heteroskedasticity, and a residual plot 
that is indicative of a non-linear functional form (Fig-
ure 2).  This is common in welfare caseload studies 
(e.g., Ziliak, Figlio, Davis, and Connolly, 2000; Blank, 
2001; McKinnish, 2005).  Like our predecessors, we 
used the logarithm of our dependent variable in our 
second round of regressions.  Comparing Figures 2 
and 3 shows a dramatic improvement in the distribu-
tion of the residuals.  Column (i) in Table 7 displays 
the results of estimating the regression explaining the 
logarithm of the welfare participation rate9 without 
the county-level controls (Xit) while column (ii) gives 
the results with these controls.  Both of these regres-
                                                 
9 Six observations from counties with small populations and zero 
families participating in the welfare program were dropped from 
the analysis. 
134                                                                                                              Snarr and Burkey  
sions were again estimated with year-effects and state 
fixed effects, only this time we used the logarithm of 
distance instead of the border county dummy.  Again, 
we used the White estimator to correct the standard 
errors to help account for any remaining heteroskedas-
ticity.  
 
 
 
Figure 2. Residuals Versus Fitted Values (with de-
pendent variable = Pijt) 
 
 
  
Figure 3. Residuals Versus Fitted Values (with de-
pendent variable = log Pijt ) 
 
 
 The columns of Table 7 show a dramatic im-
provement in fit when county-level controls are in-
cluded in the regression. Without the control vari-
ables, we see the expected positive effect of the nearest 
state’s time limit on enrollment, and the enrollment 
rate falls as distance increases.  Even though the esti-
mated coefficient of the interaction between these two 
variables is statistically significant its sign is negative.  
The linear and quadratic effects of the state’s own time 
limit are statistically insignificant.   
 In column (ii) we see that when the control vari-
ables are included, the neighboring state’s linear time 
limit effect and distance are still statistically significant 
with the expected signs.  However, the linear and 
quadratic effects of the state’s own time limit are now 
statistically significant.  How these two effects influ-
ence the participation rate is illustrated in Figure 4.  As 
time limits approach in a given county, participation 
rates initially fall but then eventually level off as ex-
pected.  The interaction between the neighboring 
state’s time limit and distance is now statistically in-
significant.  The signs of most of the control variables 
are as expected and highly statistically significant, and 
increase the R2 to 0.8271.  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
  
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
 
Figure 4.  MTLH and MTLN’s Contribution to ln(Pjit) 
 
 
 The natural logarithm of the distance from a 
county’s centroid and the nearest state border had a 
negative, statistically significant impact on welfare 
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Table 6.  Regression Results (Pijt)  
 
 Variable  (i)  (ii)   
 
 Intercept 9.34155*** 7.40998*** 
  (0.38003) (0.36161) 
 BORD 0.26028* -0.00269  
  (0.10161) (0.06905) 
 BORD x MTLN -0.00367 -0.00719  
  (0.00869) (0.00585) 
 MTLH -0.08093** -0.12518*** 
  (0.02711) (0.01833) 
 MTLN 0.11750*** 0.07021*** 
  (0.02637) (0.01655) 
 MTLH x MTLH  0.00227* 0.00416*** 
  (0.00100) (0.00067) 
 MTLN x MTLN -0.00451*** -0.00245*** 
  (0.00096) (0.00060) 
 UNEMP  0.49118*** 
   (0.02306) 
 EMPGR  -0.00525 
   (0.00534) 
 SERWG  -0.00769  
   (0.01080) 
 RENT  -0.00769*** 
   (0.00059) 
 EDUC  -0.05265*** 
   (0.00489) 
 ARMED  -0.08239*** 
   (0.01133) 
 URBAN  0.00826*** 
   (0.00112) 
 HISPAN  0.04837*** 
   (0.00448) 
 BLACK  0.06078*** 
   (0.00496) 
 NATIVE  0.10116*** 
   (0.01554) 
 Year-effects -4.8604*** -4.02858*** 
  (0.0965) (0.07162) 
 State-effects† 
 
 R-Square 0.4702 0.7555  
 Adjusted R-Square 0.465 0.7529  
 F-statistic 99.34 283.60  
 Degrees of Freedom 55, 6156 65, 5965  
 
Standard errors were corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White Correction, and reported in parentheses. 
*** Estimate is significant at the 0.001 level. 
** Estimate is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Estimate is significant at the 0.1 level.  
† Results not shown. 
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Table 7.  Regression Results ln(Pijt)  
 
 Variable  (i)  (ii)   
 
 Intercept 2.209152*** 2.146402*** 
  (0.046817) (0.045334) 
 log(DIST) -0.039878*** -0.012227** 
  (0.007191) (0.004570) 
 MTLN ÷ log(DIST) -0.008228*** -0.003108  
  (0.002207) (0.001965) 
 MTLH -0.000443 -0.005328* 
  (0.003815) (0.002403) 
 MTLN 0.012757*** 0.003886* 
  (0.003004) (0.001866) 
 MTLH x MTLH -0.000022 0.000197* 
  (0.000144) (0.000090) 
 MTLN x MTLN -0.000423*** -0.000130* 
  (0.000110) (0.000067) 
 UNEMP  0.057860*** 
   (0.002379) 
 EMPGR  0.000012 
   (0.000833) 
 SERWG  0.009637*** 
   (0.001521) 
 RENT  -0.001716*** 
   (0.000086) 
 EDUC  -0.014228*** 
   (0.000703) 
 ARMED  -0.001366 
   (0.001638) 
 URBAN  0.001828*** 
   (0.000170) 
 BLACK  0.008633*** 
   (0.000439) 
 HISPAN  0.005717*** 
   (0.000464) 
 NATIVE  0.011260*** 
   (0.001283) 
 Year-effects -0.910951*** -0.754333*** 
  (0.013622) (0.010022) 
 State-effects† 
 
 R-Square 0.5782 0.8271 
 Adjusted R-Square 0.5744 0.8252  
 F-statistic 153.4106 438.93 
 Degrees of Freedom 55, 6156 65, 5965 
  
Standard errors were corrected for heteroskedasticity using the White Correction, and reported in parentheses. 
*** Estimate is significant at the 0.001 level. 
** Estimate is significant at the 0.01 level. 
* Estimate is significant at the 0.1 level.  
† Results not shown 
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enrollment.  The coefficient of -.012 can be interpreted 
as an elasticity: A one percent increase in the distance 
is associated with a .012 percent decrease in welfare 
enrollment rates.  This provides some evidence of wel-
fare flipping, as counties closer to a border have in-
creased enrollment rates. 
 However, the key interaction term, MTLN ÷ 
log(DIST) is not statistically significant and of the 
wrong sign.  In this term, we interacted the time limit 
of the nearest state with 1/log(DIST) because MTLN 
and DIST are a priori assumed to affect welfare en-
rollment in opposite directions.  Therefore, a direct 
interaction would not be appropriate.   
 The own-state and bordering-state time limit in-
tensity variables were estimated allowing for the pos-
sibility of a nonlinear effect, since one might expect a 
larger impact on welfare enrollment immediately after 
a time limit is imposed, with the effect tapering off 
over time.  This is indeed what the estimates suggest.  
These quadratic functions’ effects on the natural log of 
the participation rate are graphed in Figure 4.10  The 
effect of time limits on the own state’s enrollment rate 
is a fairly steep decline of about 4% in enrollment.  
However, the effect of a nearby state’s time limit ap-
pears to have a more gradual, somewhat smaller off-
setting impact on enrollment peaking at around 14 
months. This effect of a nearby state’s time limit is ad-
ditional evidence supporting the idea of welfare flip-
ping. 
 Areas with high unemployment have higher levels 
of welfare enrollment, but recent growth in the num-
ber of jobs created in the service sector appeared to 
have no impact on welfare enrollment.  However, we 
found some evidence of employment-related migra-
tion, as the estimate for Service-Industry wages indi-
cates that higher wages may be attracting welfare 
families who realize that they will likely be required to 
work as part of the welfare program.  However, offset-
ting this is the cost of living, as proxied by the median 
rent paid in the county. 
 The remaining control variables for race, educa-
tion, and urbanness all have the expected sign.  The 
variable representing the prevalence of the armed ser-
vices in a county was statistically insignificant.  The     
-0.75 coefficient for the year 2000 control variable es-
timates that other (unmeasured) effects account for a 
decrease of approximately 53 percent in welfare en-
rollment between 1990 and 2000. 
 
                                                 
10 To interpret the effect of adding or subtracting a number from the 
natural log of a dependent variable, calculate eB-1.  The result is the 
proportionate increase in the dependent variable in question. 
6. Conclusions  
 
 The imposition of welfare time limits in some 
states results in a higher interstate benefit differential 
for a household nearing a time limit than what existed 
under AFDC – after a family has run out of benefits in 
their home state.  If the household remains in its home 
state it cannot receive benefits in the following month. 
However, if it migrates to a nearby state, it resets its 
TANF clock because states do not currently share data 
and cannot impose minimum residency requirements.  
Thus, the benefit differential is equal to the nearest 
state’s cash grant.  The incentive for time-limit in-
duced welfare migration is clear – whether or not 
people act on this incentive is the issue that we have 
attempted to ascertain in this paper.  
 Similar to previous research, we found that a state 
can lower its own welfare enrollment by implement-
ing a time limit.  However, our finding that this reduc-
tion in enrollment may cause spillovers into nearby 
states is the first of its kind.  Finding some evidence of 
time-limit induced migration and “welfare-flipping” 
as people move to reenroll in welfare highlights the 
need for additional research and possible reforms of 
the system.  If time limits are causing families to waste 
resources by moving rather than returning people to 
work and self-sufficiency, then the time limits in state 
TANF programs merely create an inefficiency.  Be-
cause this is only a preliminary investigation of the 
existence of time-limit migration, and many states’ 
time limits had not become binding by the year 2000, 
there are several ways that this research can be im-
proved and extended in the future.  
First, continuing to create more accurate variables 
measuring the cost of moving to another state is likely 
to improve the accuracy and meaningfulness of the 
results. Second, because this data is explicitly spatial in 
nature, the use of spatial regression techniques to de-
termine if the coefficients may be biased due to spatial 
autocorrelation or heterogeneity is advisable.  Third, 
as we mentioned earlier, the use of micro data would 
be ideal for testing the “welfare-flipping” hypothesis 
because migration behavior cannot be truly tested 
with macro data due to ecological inference problems.   
Lastly, investigators should attempt to include addi-
tional policy and descriptive variables in an attempt to 
simultaneously estimate the possible effects of benefit, 
amenity, and employment-related migration, in addi-
tion to looking for evidence of time-limit induced mi-
gration. 
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Appendix  
Proof of PROPOSITION 1: The household migrates if 1
Ev exceeds 0
Ev , which is equivalent to  
( ) ( ) ( ) ( )ln (1) ln (1) ln (0) ln (0)E E E Ec c c cβ β+ > +  
 ( ) ( )(1 ) ln (1) (1 ) ln (0)E Ec cβ β+ > +  
 
(1) (0)E Ec c>  
 
( ) ( ) ( )n nG wh G G w h wh d F G wh G wh G whκ β β β+ + − + − − − + + > + + +  
 
n nG G w h wh F dκ− + − − >  
 
n nG G w h wh Fd
d
− + − −<  
 
Proof of PROPOSITION 2: The proof of Proposition 2 follows the proof above.  
 
